We examine short combinatorial games for three or more players under a new play convention in which a player who cannot move on their turn is the unique loser.
Introduction
The vast majority of prior work in combinatorial game theory has focused on twoplayer games. In this paper, we investigate a novel play convention for N -player games. When no move is available, the next player is declared the unique loser of the game, and the other players all win equally. This convention was independently conceived by Salt in [7] . In one sense, this complicates matters, since more than one player may have a winning strategy. However, as compared to previous work on multiplayer games, this convention leads to results that better parallel those for two-player games under the normal play convention. Our work and objects of study fit into the general framework for combinatorial game theory laid out in [9] .
A summary of much of the prior work done on combinatorial games with three or more players can be found in I.4 of [8] . This paper is closely connected with the related work of Propp, Cincotti, and Doles (née Greene).
In [6] , Propp considers three-player impartial games with a certain play convention: In analogy with two-player normal play, when no move is available, the previous player is declared the unique winner of the game. This yields a recursive characterization of outcome classes N , O, and P in which the test for O contains a proviso reminiscent of the misère play convention for two-player games.
In [1] , Cincotti considers three-player partizan games under a convention which reduces to Propp's in the impartial case. When a player cannot move on their turn, arXiv:1903.01375v1 [math.CO] 4 Mar 2019 they are eliminated. The other players continue to play from that position. The last player remaining is the unique winner. Cincotti extends this convention to N -player games in [2] .
In [3] , Doles (née Greene) considers three-player partizan games with a convention similar to Propp's. The last player to move wins first place. The player before that wins second place. And the player who cannot move on their turn loses/is ranked third place. Under this convention, an assumption that players always play rationally leads to some player having a winning strategy.
In this paper, we consider the play convention in which the first player without an available move is the unique loser of the game. In Section 2, we examine three-player impartial games and give special attention to three-player Nim, closely paralleling the work of Propp in [6] . We examine how the outcome of a disjunctive sum can vary depending on the outcomes of the summands, discuss reverting games, construct some undetermined games which make all sums undetermined, and derive the finite quotient describing play in three-player Nim. In Section 3, we generalize much of the content of the previous section to N players. We do not completely characterize the outcomes of a sum or of Nim, but some partial results are obtained, including the outcomes of all Nim positions with two heaps. In Section 4, we consider partizan games with N players. We define a preorder based on favorability to a particular player in disjunctive sums, characterize all comparisons with the empty game 0 (and show that 0 is not equal to any other partizan game), show that the simplification theorems regarding dominated and reversible options have natural analogues for N players, and examine some particular games related to the two-player integer games. We conclude in Section 5 with a collection of open questions.
Three-Player Impartial Games

Preliminaries
In this subsection, we introduce the games under discussion, the notation and terminology we use for three-player impartial games, and some initial observations.
Notation
Unless otherwise specified, all games in this paper are assumed to be short games; they have finitely many distinct subpositions, and admit no infinite runs.
As is common, an impartial game is usually considered to be the set of its options, + denotes the disjunctive sum of games, n · G denotes the sum of n copies of G, G and G * typically denote an option of a game G, etc. We use ∼ = to indicate that two games are isomorphic (i.e. the game trees are isomorphic). Additionally, we also make use of structural induction in proofs throughout, often without comment.
Proof. The existence of G * means that O, P / ∈ o(G), and the other condition forces N / ∈ o(G).
General Results
In this subsection, we investigate the outcomes of sums of games, and derive some equations and inequations for games.
Outcomes of Sums
In the two-player theory of impartial games under normal play, if we put aside the more-precise Sprague-Grundy Theory, there are two main facts worth noting about the outcomes of sums as compared to the outcomes of the summands: 1. the outcome of G + G, and 2. the possible outcomes of G + H-if o(H) = P then o(G + H) = o(G), but if o(G) = o(H) = N then o(G + H) can be either P or N . We examine three-player analogues of these results.
Theorem 2.8 (Next Generation). If N / ∈ o(H), then o(G + H) ⊆ o(G).
In other words, adding on a component to a game cannot introduce a winning strategy for a new player unless Next has a winning strategy in the new component. Since o(0) = OP, this is similar to the two-player result that adding a P-position to a game does not change its outcome. Proof. Let G, H be games, and suppose N / ∈ o(H). If P / ∈ o(G), then we can choose an option G * with O / ∈ o (G * ). But then O / ∈ o (G * + H) by inductive hypothesis, so that P / ∈ o(G + H). If O / ∈ o(G), then we can choose an option G * with N / ∈ o (G * ). But then N / ∈ o (G * + H) by induction, so that O / ∈ o(G + H). If N / ∈ o(G), then P / ∈ o (G ) for all options G . Similarly, P / ∈ o (H ) for all options H . Therefore, by induction, we have both P / ∈ o (G + H) and P / ∈ o (G + H ) for arbitrary options. As such, N / ∈ o(G + H) by definition.
Proof. For a list of representative examples, see Table 9 in the Appendix. For instance, o( * 2) = N , o( * ) = PN , and o( * 2 + * ) = N O.
The possible outcomes of sums are summarized in Table 1 , where entries indicate that any subset (other than N OP) is possible. For example, if o(G) = O and o(H) = PN , then o(G + H) may be any of ∅, N , P, PN .
As in [6] , we also examine sums of a game with itself. Proof. For examples of all 23 cases, see Table 7 in the Appendix. For instance, o( * 2) = N and o( * 2 + * 2) = O.
The possible outcomes of the sum of a game with itself are summarized in Table 2 . In the impartial two-player setting, the Tweedledum-Tweedledee strategy yields o(G + G) = P. A similar result holds for three players. Table 8 in the Appendix for example games covering the known cases. For instance, o( * ) = PN , but o( * + * + * ) = OP.
Equality of Impartial Games
As in the two-player case, we are interested in when games are similar enough to be replaced in disjunctive sums. As is standard, we define = by the fundamental equivalence (see [8] ).
Definition 2.17. (Impartial Equality) We say G equals H and write
We first examine reversible moves, as they are key to understanding equality classes of two-player games, both in normal and misère play. Our presentation is based on the similar Definition V.1.3 in [8] .
Definition 2.18. Let G, H be games. We say that H is revertible to G if both of the following hold.
• For every option G of G, H has a corresponding option G equal to G .
• For every option H of H not equal to some G , H has a second option H * * equal to G.
In two-player settings, if H is revertible to G (with a slight modification in misère play), then H = G. With three-players under normal play, only one conclusion holds in general (see Proposition 2.21).
Proof. Suppose N ∈ o(H + X). If the winning move has the form H + X * , then P ∈ o(H + X * ) so that P ∈ o(G + X * ) by induction. Hence, the same move would win in G + X, and N ∈ o(G + X). Now suppose the winning move in H + X is to something of the form G * + X with G * equal to an option G * of G. Then
Finally, if the winning move is to an option H * not equal to an option of G, then the other two players can move to yield some H * * * + X where H * * * = G. Note that N ∈ o(H * * * + X) as we started with a winning move in 
Therefore, there is at most one equality class of absorbing games.
Proposition 2.24. If G is an absorbing game, then G + H = G for any H.
Proposition 2.24 justifies the name "absorbing".
Theorem 2.25 (Absorbing Game Construction). Suppose that G has at least one option, and all options G are undetermined (o(G ) = ∅). Then G is an absorbing game.
Proof. Let G be as in the statement.
Corollary 2.26. An absorbing game exists.
Three-Player Nim
Nim is a classic ruleset in Combinatorial Game Theory that can serve as a demonstrative case study. In this subsection, we calculate the outcomes of all Nim positions, as well as the quotient corresponding to playing only Nim. When playing Nim with three players under normal play, there are only finitely many different classes of positions to be concerned with, though more than in the play convention considered in [6] .
In the language of [4] , the positions of three-player Nim form a three-player analogue of a "universe". But it is not "parental" as all Nim positions are impartial. And it is not "dense" even in an impartial sense, as no Nim position has outcome P (see Theorem 2.40).
Outcomes of Nim Positions
We classify the outcomes of Nim positions. We start by noting the outcomes of 40 particular positions, and then use a few lemmas to justify that the apparent patterns extend to all positions. This approach is similar to applications of the Octal Periodicity Theorem (see Thm. IV.2.7 of [8] ).
Lemma 2.29. The outcomes of 40 Nim positions of the form k · * + G are recorded in Table 4 . Lemma 2.31 (Nim Periodicity). Let G be a game. Suppose that all options G are 3-periodic and that o (G) = o (3 · * + G). Then G is 3-periodic as well.
Proof. Suppose k ≥ 4. Then the options of k · * + G are (k − 1) · * + G and those of the form k · * + G for options G . These have the same outcomes as (k − 4) · * + G (by induction on k) and (k − 3) · * + G (since G is 3-periodic), respectively. But those are exactly all of the options of (k − 3) · * + G. Since k · * + G has the same outcomes of options,
Lemma 2.32 (Nim Stability). Let G be a game. Suppose that for all subpositions
Proof. Let m ≥ 4. Via induction on m, it suffices to verify that o (G + * (m + 1)) = o (G + * m).
The options of G + * (m + 1) are G + * m, those of the form G + * for < m (all of which are options of G + * m), and those of the form G + * (m + 1).
By induction on m, o (G + * m) = o (G + * (m − 1)). And by induction on G, o (G + * (m + 1)) = o (G + * m). Trivially, o (G + * ) = o (G + * ). In all cases, an option of G + * (m + 1) has the same outcome as an option of G + * m.
Conversely, the options of G + * m are those of the form G + * for < m, and those of the form G + * m. All of which have outcome equal to that of an option of G + * (m + 1).
As outcomes of options are the same, o (G + * (m + 1)) = o(G + * m).
Lemma 2.33. The patterns of outcomes for the Nim positions of the form k · * + G in Table 5 are accurate.
Proof. Apply Nim Periodicity to the upper 7 rows of Table 4 , and then apply Nim Stability to 0, followed by * 2. 
Proof. Set G ∼ = k · * + * m 1 + * m 2 . If k = 0, then G has the undetermined option * 2 + * m 2 by Lemma 2.33. If k ≥ 1, then G has the undetermined option (k − 1) · * + * m 1 + * m 2 by induction on k. By Proposition 2.7, it suffices to show that no option G has P ∈ o(G ). By induction and Lemma 2.33, the only subpositions with that property are of the form j · * + * 2 or j · * , neither of which is possible for an option.
where Previous has a winning strategy are of the form j · * + * 2 or j · * . By Proposition 2.7, k · * + * 2 + * m 1 + * m 2 is undetermined. Theorem 2.40. The outcome of a Nim position is determined by the numbers of heaps of size 1, size 2, and size at least 3. Specifically, the outcome is ∅ unless the position has the form k · * + * n or k · * + * 2 + * n, in which case the outcome is listed in Table 5 .
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 2.29 and Lemmas 2.33 through 2.39.
Nim Quotient
In direct analogy to misère quotients (as covered in V.4 of [8] ), we define an equivalence relation on the set of Nim positions which is coarser than "=". While the two-player misère quotient of Nim is infinite, the three-player normal play quotient of Nim has size 16. Proof. Since Nim positions are closed under addition, J + X is a Nim position whenever X is, so that o ((G + J) Proof. By two applications of Proposition 2.42,
For convenience, let Q be the set of equivalence classes of Nim positions under ≡. Note that since 0 is a Nim position, Proposition 2.43 gives Q the structure of a commutative monoid. As with the convention for misère quotients, let Φ(G) denote the equivalence class of a Nim position G. We follow convention to write elements of Q with lowercase letters and the operation multiplicatively. For example, if x = Φ(G) and y = Φ(H), then xy = Φ(G + H); we also write 1 = Φ(0).
Since the restriction of o to the Nim positions factors through Q, we adopt notation from V.6 of [8] and use Π to denote the corresponding map on Q. 
2 (which has order 16) and the values of Π given in Table 6 . Proof. In Theorem 2.40, the outcomes only depend on the number of heaps of size 1 modulo 3.
Lemma 2.49. The 16 equivalence classes listed in Table 6 are distinct.
Proof. Note that Π is well defined on equivalence classes, so the only pairs of classes that might be identical are those with the same outcome. We apply Lemma 2.48 repeatedly below.
•
• a 2 , ab, ac, a 2 b 2 , a 2 bc are all distinct because the outcomes after multiplying by a are OP, PN , N , O, ∅, respectively.
• b, c, a 2 c, ab 2 , abc are all distinct because the outcomes after multiplying by a • bc = c 2 because Π(abc) = N and Π(ac 2 ) = ∅ by Lemma 2.34.
It remains to prove enough other relations to conclude that Table 6 is complete.
Lemma 2.50. For each n ≥ 3, c = Φ( * n), that is, * 3 ≡ * n.
Proof. In Theorem 2.40, none of the outcome determinations depend on the exact size of a heap that has size at least 3.
Lemma 2.51. For any x ∈ Q, xb 3 = xb 2 c = xc
Proof. By Lemma 2.39, * 2+ * 2+ * 2+ * 2 and * 3+ * 3+ * 3 are absorbing games. But note that Lemma 2.51 tells us that in the context of Nim positions only, * 2 + * 2 + * 2 and * 3 + * 3 have a similar absorbing property.
Lemma 2.53. There are only 16 elements of Q as listed in Table 6 , and the presentation in the statement of Theorem 2.46 is accurate.
Proof. By a 3 = 1 (from Lemma 2.48) and b 3 = b 4 and c 2 = c 3 (from Corollary 2.52) and the commutativity of disjunctive sum, the only possible elements of Q are of the form a x b y c z for x, z < 3, y < 4. However, if z = 2 or y + z ≥ 3 then the element is equal to c 2 by Corollary 2.52. This leaves 15 other possibilities with y + z < 3 and z < 2, for a total of 16.
With this, we have proven Theorem 2.46. For comparison, in Section 5 of [6] , Nim is analyzed under Propp's play convention in which Previous is the unique winner of 0. Rephrasing his results in our terminology, the three-player Nim quotient for that play convention has size 9, though he shows that there are infinitely many equality classes of Nim positions.
Note that in the case of Nim positions alone, we recover something like a more faithful version of Next Generation (Theorem 2.8).
N -Player Impartial Games
Many results from Section 2 can be generalized to N players. Throughout this entire section, N refers to the number of players (N ≥ 2). We explicitly mention when assuming N > 2 is necessary.
For some results, the results and proofs are nearly identical to those in the threeplayer case, but others become more complex, such as the construction of absorbing games for N players.
A game is still a finite set of options, and we continue to use ∼ = to indicate that two games are isomorphic (i.e. the game trees are isomorphic).
Preliminaries
In the impartial setting, we denote the various players as N, O 1 , . . . , O N −2 , P. N is the "Next" player, P is the "Previous" player, and the rest are the "Other" players. At times, it is convenient to use O 0 for N and O N −1 for P. Definition 3.1. The N -player (normal-play) outcome o(G) of a game G is a subset of {N, . . . , P} whose members are determined recursively as follows.
• N ∈ o(G) exactly when there exists an option G with P ∈ o(G ).
The following analogues of the propositions in 2.1.2 all hold.
exactly when N ∈ o ({G}).
3. If G has an option G * with o(G * ) = ∅ and has no option G with For a non-empty outcome set that does not include N, we can apply claim 2 to cycle the outcome set of a game whose outcome includes N. For example, if N = 6, then {{ * , 3 · * , 4 · * }} has outcome
Finally, we construct a game G with o(G) = ∅, if N > 2, we can take G ∼ = {H, {H}} where H ∼ = {0, . . . , (N − 2) · * }. In this game, Next chooses whether O 1 or O 2 selects any player (other than themselves) to lose the game.
Outcomes of Sums
in the N -player setting. In fact, the proof for N players is nearly identical to the one for three players.
Proof. Let G, H be games, and suppose
We generalize Other Procreation in two respects-more summands, and different players.
Proof. Note that the case of k = 1 is trivial, so we assume k ≥ 2. First, we consider the case m = 0, so that O m = N. By repeatedly applying
Proposition 2.15 about the outcome of G + G + G generalizes straightforwardly.
Proof. All players can mirror the moves made by Next in the N components.
In the N -player setting, we can still examine reversible moves.
Definition 3.6. We say that H is revertible to G if both of the following hold.
• For every option H of H not equal to some G , H has an (N − 1) st option H * ··· * equal to G.
The proof is nearly identical to the argument for three players (see Theorem 2.19), but is written here in full, for convenience.
Proof. Suppose N ∈ o(H + X). If the winning move has the form H + X * , then P ∈ o(H + X * ) so that P ∈ o(G + X * ) by induction. Hence, the same move would win in G + X, and N ∈ o(G + X). Now suppose the winning move in H + X is to something of the form G * + X with G * equal to an option
Finally, if the winning move is to an option H * not equal to an option of G, then the other N − 1 players can move to yield some H * ··· * + X where H * ··· * = G. Note that N ∈ o(H * ··· * + X) as we started with a winning move in
As with three players, replacing options with equal games yields an equal game.
The proof is identical to that of the three-player case (see Corollary 2.20).
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to show that o(H + X) ⊆ o(G + X) for all X. But that follows immediately from Theorem 3.7 since H is revertible to G. Proposition 2.21 about 3 · * generalizes to the N -player setting. 
for a total position of (2N − 3) · * . At this point, O 4 is to move unless N < 5, in which case it is O 4−N . In any case, after 2N − 3 more moves, O 1 loses.
Undetermined and Absorbing Games
Recall (see Definition 2.6) that a game G is said to be undetermined if o(G) = ∅. Proposition 3.10. A sum of undetermined games is undetermined.
Proof. As with Corollary 2.9, this follows from Next Generation (Theorem 3.3).
We can make this result more precise. Definition 3.11. An undetermined game G is said to be 1-undetermined. And, for k > 1, G is said to be k-undetermined if G has an option G * that is (k − 1)-undetermined.
In other words, G is k-undetermined if there is a directed path of length k + 1 starting at G through undetermined subpositions. Note that if G is k-undetermined, then it is also, a fortiori, j-undetermined for 1 ≤ j < k.
Proof. Let G be k-undetermined and H be m-undetermined.
First, suppose that
The concept of k-undetermined games allows us to generalize Corollary 2.12.
Proof. Since G is (N − 2)-undetermined, we can choose a sequence of N − 2 subpositions J 0 , J 1 , . . . , J N −3 where J 0 ∼ = G, each J i+1 is an option of J i , and each J i is undetermined. Note that J i + H is an subposition of G + H reached after i moves.
Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that P ∈ o(G + H) for some particular game H. Then P ∈ o(J 0 + H), and since J 0 is undetermined, Next Generation tells us that
Putting all of these conclusions about H together, we have shown that all players have winning strategies in H, which is impossible by claim 1 of Proposition 3.2.
We use this Lemma to generalize Proposition 2.27. Below, x denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to x. Proposition 3.14. If N > 2 and G is (N − 2)-undetermined, then all options of N/2 + 2 · G are undetermined.
Then there is a winning move;
But both cases are impossible by Lemma 3.13. Now suppose j ≥ 1 and
Since G is undetermined, Proposition 3.10 yields that N/2 + 1 · G is undetermined. By Next Generation, N ∈ o (G * ). Hence, we can choose a winning move G * * . Then
In particular, by taking the option G * * of each component in the sum when possible, and the option of G * of a component when necessary, we may choose an option H so that it has at least two components of G. For example, if N = 6 and j = N −2 = 4, then O 3 ∈ 4·G+G * * , O 1 ∈ 3·G+2·G * * , and N ∈ 2·G+G * +2·G * * .
Since N ∈ o(H), there is an option H * with P ∈ o (H * ). Since our chosen H has at least two components of G, H * has at least one. Just as with the j = 0 case, this is impossible by by Lemma 3.13.
We will not use this fact, but the above proof of Proposition 3.14 would have worked the same way for any sum of N/2 + 2 games, each of which is (N − 2)-undetermined.
Recall (see Definition 2.22) that a game G is said to be absorbing if G + H is undetermined for all H.
We can use Lemma 3.13 to obtain an N -player analogue of the Absorbing Game Construction.
Definition 3.15. For k > 1, a game G is said to be strongly k-undetermined if G 0 and and all options of G are (k − 1)-undetermined.
Equivalently, we could replace "G 0" with "G is undetermined" or "G is k-undetermined" in the above definition.
Proposition 3.16. If G and H are games such that G is strongly k-undetermined and H is strongly m-undetermined, then G + H is strongly (k + m)-undetermined.
Proof. Every option of G + H is of the form G + H or G + H and is (k + m − 1)-undetermined by Proposition 3.12. Proof. We show by a finite induction on k that O k / ∈ o(G + H) for any H. First, we handle the base case k = 0. Suppose, for sake of contradiction that N ∈ o(G + H) for some game H. Then either P ∈ o(G * + H) for some G * or P ∈ o(G + H * ) for some H * . Both cases are impossible by Lemma 3.13; the former is impossible by since each G * is (N − 2)-undetermined, and the latter is impossible since G itself is, a fortiori,
, which is impossible by induction.
Note that Propositions 2.24 and 2.23 hold with the same proofs, so there is a unique equality class of absorbing games which absorbs summands to produce undetermined games. Proof. Note that N/2 + 2 · G is ((N − 2) N/2 + 2 )-undetermined by Proposition 3.12. By Proposition 3.14, N/2 + 2 · G is strongly undetermined. Since (N − 2) N/2 + 2 ≥ N − 1, N/2 + 2 · G is an absorbing game by the Absorbing Game Construction.
Corollary 3.19. If N > 2 and G is undetermined, then (N − 2) N/2 + 2 · G is an absorbing game.
Proof. Note that G is at least 1-undetermined, so that (N − 2) · G is (N − 2)-undetermined by Proposition 3.12. Then apply Corollary 3.18.
N -player Nim
In this subsection, we apply generalizations of the periodicity/stability lemmas to obtain some results about Nim that hold for general N .
In this subsection only, it is particularly helpful at times to write complements of outcomes. 
The proof is almost identical to that of three-player Nim Periodicity.
Proof. Suppose k ≥ N + 1. Then the options of k · * + G are (k − 1) · * + G and those of the form k · * + G for options G . These have the same outcomes as (k − N − 1) · * + G (by induction on k) and (k − N ) · * + G (since G is N -periodic), respectively. But those are exactly all of the options of (k − N ) · * + G. Since k · * + G has the same outcomes of options, Since 0 is N -periodic, * is N -periodic as well, so that all options of * 2 are Nperiodic. Therefore, by Nim Periodicity, it suffices to show that o( * 2+N · * ) = o( * 2).
We show by induction on i that for 0 For i > 0, note that Next can move to * 2 + (i − 1) · * , which has outcome
. The other options of * 2 + i · * are i · * and (i + 1) · * , which have outcomes {O i } and {O i+1 }, respectively. Aside from the three players Next, O i+1 , and O i+2 , all other players have winning strategies. And since i = N − 1, the move to i · * is a winning move (i.e. P ∈ o(i · * )), and so N ∈ o( * 2 + i · * ). Thus,
Similarly, o( * 2 + (N − 2) · * ) = {P} since the options have outcomes {O N −2 } (which includes P), {P}, and (if N > 2) {O N −2 , P}, respectively.
Then o( * 2 + (N − 1) · * ) = {O 1 } since the options have outcomes {P}, {N} (which includes P), and {P}, respectively.
Finally, we consider o( * 2 + N · * ). The options have outcomes {N}, {O 1 }, and
Corollary 3.23. The periodic sequence of outcomes o( * 2 + i · * ) is
Proof. This follows from the proof of Proposition 3.22 above. Proof. The proof is identical to that of Three-Player Nim Stability (Lemma 2.32), except that 4 should be replaced with k + 1.
In fact, the proof would work with * N replaced with any * k. However, when G is a "small" Nim position, it seems that we first observe stability at * N .
We can use Nim Stability to calculate the outcomes of all Nim positions with at most two heaps, assuming N > 2. The results are collected in Theorem 3.29 and can be summarized as follows: Players other than Next and O 1 do not have a winning strategy unless the game is guaranteed to end before their turn. Ignoring the case of the empty game 0, Next fails to have a winning strategy exactly when there are two heaps of size at least N − 1, and O 1 fails to have a winning strategy when there is only one heap or if the sizes of the two heaps are at least N − 1 and N , respectively. Proof. We use induction on i for 1 ≤ i < N . If i = 1, then there is only one line of play, and the outcome is certainly {O 1 }. For 1 < i < N , the options are 0 and all * j with 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1. The former has outcome {N}, and the latter have outcomes of the form
by the same argument as for * (N −1) except that it doesn't matter that P / ∈ o ( * (N − 1) ). By the same argument, or by the argument in the proof of Nim Stability, this extends to all larger heaps as well.
Proof. Note that the hypothesis forces N > 2. First, o ( * + * ) = {O 2 } since there is only one line of play. Now suppose i + j > 2. Then the options of * i + * j are * i, * j, and all smaller sums of two nonempty heaps of the forms ( * i) + * j and * i + ( * j) .
Note that Recall (see Definition 2.6) that a game G is said to be undetermined if o(G) = ∅. 
Proof. The first four cases follow immediately from Definition 3. 
Partizan Games
In this section, we discuss the extension of normal play to the N -player partizan setting. As in Section 3, throughout this entire section, N refers to the number of players (N ≥ 2). And we explicitly mention when assuming N > 2 is necessary.
We begin by setting up notation and machinery to discuss and compare partizan games. In the following subsection, we prove some general results about comparing games. Finally, we consider some specific games generalizing integers in the twoplayer case.
Preliminaries
Throughout this section, a (partizan) game is now an ordered N -tuple of finite sets of partizan games. They are still "short" in that they are finite and nonloopy, so that there is a bound on the length of a run. We continue to use ∼ = to indicate that two games are isomorphic (i.e. their game trees with labeled edges are isomorphic). In general, our definitions and notation parallel the two-player standard as in Section II.1 of [8] . Similar decisions were made in [1] , [2] , and [3] .
The N players are named "Left", "Center 1 ", "Center 2 ", . . . , "Center N −2 ", and "Right". They each make moves in a cyclic fashion, with "Left" moving after "Right" and before "Center 1 ", etc.
We write some games with an extension of the bar notation commonly used for two players. For example,
When convenient, we use "C 0 " in place of L and "C N −1 " in place of R. In [1] and [3] , which only consider three-player games, our Center 1 is called "Center" and our C 1 is "C".
If it is Left's turn to move in G, then they choose one of the Left options in G L to move to. Analogously for the other players. If there is no option available to a player on their turn, we declare them the unique loser, and the other N − 1 players all win equally. As in the impartial case, we call this convention normal play.
As it should not cause undue confusion, we use 0 in partizan contexts to denote a game with no options 0 ∼ = { | · · · | }. In general, we interpret impartial games as partizan ones in the natural way; * ∼ = {0 | 0 | · · · | 0}, etc. Following [1] , we define 1 L ∼ = {0 | · · · | }, and analogously 1 Ci and 1 R . Note that we never use or similar to denote "options of options", as it could be confused with notation like {0 | | 0}, which denotes a particular three-player game with no Center 1 options.
Outcomes, Sums, and Conjugates
In order to speak of the outcome of a partizan game, it is helpful to examine the impartial games that result when we select a player to make the first move.
Definition 4.1. Given a partizan game G, we recursively define N impartial games, the restrictions of G, as follows. For 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 2, the Center i restriction is
, where G Ci j ranges over the options of G for Center i . The
, where G R j ranges over the options of G for Right.
Recall that if
The outcome of a two-player game is determined by the pair of impartial outcomes when Left or Right make the first move. We define the outcome in the N -player case analogously. 
For example, (N , P, O) is the three-player outcome of games where Left and only Left can secure the win, no matter which player moves first. And the outcome ({N, P}, {N, P}, {N, P}, {N, P}) is the four-player outcome of games where the next player and the previous player can each guarantee that they win (and if they play well, they will certainly win together with some other player), no matter which player moves first. Very analogously to the two-player case, we define the three-player analogue of the disjunctive sum.
Definition 4.4. Let G and H be games. The (disjunctive) sum G + H is defined recursively by
The conjugates of a game G serve as N -player analogues of the two-player negative −G, in the sense that the players' roles are interchanged. As these do not serve the role of an additive inverse, they are reminiscent of the general two-player conjugate in [4] , of which the misère adjoint defined in V.6.3 of [8] is a special case.
Definition 4.5. The first conjugate of G, denoted by G † , is defined by
In general, the k th conjugate of G is obtained by taking the first conjugate k times, as in G †··· † . We denote the sum of the first N − 1 conjugates
Note that the N th conjugate of G is G itself. For examples,
Proof. Analogously to Proposition 3.5, the players who do not move next can mirror all moves in the other N − 1 terms of the sum.
Note that there is nothing like an absorbing game in the partizan context. Proof. Let G be a game, and define H ∼ = k · 1 L , where k is greater than the depth of the game tree of G. Then Left can win G + H, no matter which player moves first, by simply making all of their moves in H.
Inequalities
In the two-player setting, we define a preorder by (misère or normal play) favorability to Left. With N players, we similarly define preorders by favorability to an individual player. Our definition is reminiscent of, but incompatible with (see Corollary 4.49), the definitions in [1] . The definition parallels the characterization for two-player inequality in Proposition V.6.1 of [8] . It was independently defined, in essentially this form, in [3] .
Definition 4.8. We write G ≤ L H if, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , Left has a winning strategy in H +X moving i th whenever Left has a winning strategy in G+X moving i th . We also write G L H for the negation of G ≤ L H. We define ≤ Ci and ≤ R analogously.
Many results below are phrased only in terms of ≤ L , but they apply equally well, mutatis mutandis, to the other relations.
Proposition 4.9. ≤ L is transitive and reflexive.
Proof. Both properties follow immediately from the corresponding properties of implication.
Proof. Suppose that Left can win (G +
We define other related notation as well.
We define the strict inequalities for the other players analogously.
Proof. We prove only the first claim, as the second claim is similar. By Proposition 4.9, G ≤ L J, so it suffices to show that J L G. Since G < L H, choose X and a play order so that Left can win H + X moving i th but does not have a strategy to win G + X moving i th . Then, since H ≤ L J, Left can win J + X moving i th as well. This witnesses that J L G. As is standard, we define = by the fundamental equivalence (see [8] ). The proof of the other direction is immediate.
Proof. This follows from Components of Equality and 2N applications of Corollary 4.11.
Inequality Results
As in the impartial case, the lack of provisos in the definition of a partizan outcome allows us to generalize some two-player normal-play results to the N -player setting.
Since the player who cannot move is the unique loser, more moves available for Left can never hurt them due to timing issues. We first characterize comparisons with the game 0 and apply this to a study of G − , and then consider more general inequalities. Many results below are stated only for Left, using ≤ L and = L . But, by symmetry, there are corresponding results for each other player.
Comparisons with Zero
We begin by confirming some general properties of preordered monoids.
Proof. If 0 ≤ L H, then by Proposition 4.10 we may add J to both sides to obtain
Next, we examine which games G satisfy 0 ≤ L G. In the proofs of Lemmas 4.21 and 4.22 to follow, we take inspiration from Theorem 7 of [5] . If Center i moves to some G Ci +X, then Center i+1 can move to G Ci +Y , and then the players other than Left can outlast all of Left's available moves in subpositions of G.
Since Left has a winning strategy in 0 + X but not G + X when Center i moves first, 0 L G. Right can move to some G R + X. If G R has no Left option, then Left loses immediately. Otherwise, Left moves to some G RL + X, in which case Center 1 can move to G RL + Y , and Left will run out of moves first. Since Left has a winning strategy in 0 + X but not G + X when moving second, 0 L G. Proof. By the Nonnegativity Rule, G only has Center i options and also only has Center j options. Since G 0, we must have i = j. 
In other words, if Left doesn't have a winning strategy in G moving first, then G is no better for Left than 0, in any context. In the two-player case, this corresponds to the well-known fact that G ≤ 0 exactly when Right can win G playing second.
Proof. For one direction, assume G ≤ L 0. Then since Left does not have a winning strategy in 0+0 moving first, Left does not have a winning strategy in G+0 moving first.
For the other direction, assume
and that Left has a winning strategy in G + X moving i th for some i.
st . So, by induction on X, Left can win all X moving (i − 1) st , and so Left can win X moving i th . Now suppose Left can win G + X moving first.
If a winning move is to some
and Left having a winning strategy in H + X moving first. H ≤ L 0 by induction on G, so that Left can win X moving first.
In the other case, a winning move is instead to some G + X L . Then Left can win G + X L moving N th . By induction on X, Left can win X L moving N th as well, so that X L would be a winning move in X, too. We also use the two rules for comparisons with 0 to examine the extent to which G − is similar to a negative for G.
Proposition 4.30. For any game
To emphasize, G + G − ≤ Ci 0 for any i by symmetry, not just i = 0.
− by the Nonnegativity Rule (or Lemma 4.22).
Proof. By the Nonnegativity Rule, G has only Left options, and has at least one. Therefore, G − has no Left options, so that Left loses moving first. Thus, by the Nonpositivity Rule, G − ≤ L 0. Since G − has a non-Left option, we apply the Nonnegativity Rule to find 0 L G − , and so G − < L 0.
Intuitively, if G never hurts Left, then Left would prefer no change to giving that same benefit to each of the other players.
Note that we cannot turn this around.
Proof. This is immediate from the Nonnegativity Rule.
General Inequalities
In the two-player case, there is a recursive characterization of ≤ (see Thm. II.1.20 in [8] ). There is a similar partial characterization of ≤ L in the N -player setting.
Proof. Let X be a game. 
. But those are all of the Center i options of H + X, so Left can win H + X moving j th . For all starting players, we have shown that Left having a winning strategy in G + X implies they have one in H + X, so G ≤ L H by Definition 4.8.
Proposition 4.35. Suppose that H is obtained from G by replacing various options with options for the same player that are equal to the original ones. More precisely, suppose that each of the following holds. Unfortunately, with more than two players, we only obtain equality for a particular player. In fact, deleting a dominated option need not even preserve the outcome of the game. Proof. There exist games J L1 and J L2 such that for the games with no options for players other than Left,
Take J L1 to be a game which allows each player to move once in turn, starting with Center 1 and ending with Left, and then Center 1 may move once more (so that Center 2 loses). Take J L2 to be the same, except the last option is another move for Left (so that Center 1 loses) instead of a move for Center 1 .
The game trees for the case of N = 3 are illustrated below.
With this as a starting point, we work our way up the game trees to see that multiple applications of the Inequality Test yield J L1 ≤ L J L2 . Thus, by Deleting Dominated Options, we can delete the dominated option to find
To distinguish the outcomes of the two games, we examine the restrictions 
Since the outcomes of the Left restrictions are not equal,
Theorem 4.38 (Bypassing Reversible Options). Let G be a game, and suppose that some N th option satisfies
where
Proof. Suppose Left can win G + X moving first. If they can win by moving to some G + X L , then by induction they could win G + X L moving last, so they can win G + X moving first. And if Left can win by moving to some G L + X (not G L ) then they can do the same in G + X.
Define H ∼ = G L C1··· R + X. The interesting case is if Left can win G + X by moving to G L + X. Then the other players can respond by moving to H, so Left can win H moving first.
If Left can win H by moving to some
But then Left could win G + X by moving to G + X L , so we're in the former case again. And if Left can win H by moving to some G L C1··· RL + X, they could do the same in G + X. Now suppose Left has a winning strategy in G + X moving i th for some i with 2 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Then they can win all
st . But G C N −i+1 + X are some of the Center N −i+1 options of G + X. And, by induction, Left can win the other Center N −i+1 options which have the form
Suppose Left can win G + X moving first. Then there are three cases. If they win by moving to some G L + X, they can do the same in G + X. If they win by moving to G +X L , then by induction they can win by moving to G+X L . If they win by moving to G L C1··· RL + X, this means they could also win
The other cases where Left can win G + X moving i th for some i with 2 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 are routine.
Since we proved both inequalities, G = L G. 
Since the outcomes of the Left restrictions are not equal, o(G) = o(0).
Integers
Earlier, we defined games with a single move for various players. For example,
, we can extend these definitions to define various "integers". We can similarly define
And analogously for the other players.
In this subsection, as a sort of case study and application of the earlier results, we examine these integers and some related games in detail.
Comparing Integers
Proof. By Proposition 4.23 (or the Nonnegativity Rule if N > 2), 0 ≤ L 1 L . Then by Proposition 4.10, we can add j · 1 L to both sides, to obtain j · 1 L ≤ L (j + 1) · 1 L for all j. By Proposition 4.13, a strict inequality propagates, so it remains to show that
Note that by Proposition 4.6, Left loses j 
Proof. Since 1 Ci has no Left options, Left loses immediately when moving first, and so G ≤ L 0 by the Nonpositivity Rule. If N = 2, k · (−1) 0 is well-known. For N > 2, since 1 Ci has an option for a player other than Left, the Nonnegativity Rule yields G L 0. Putting both inequalities together, G < L 0.
By symmetry, this means that integers for distinct non-Left players are incomparable for Left.
Proof. Note that Left wins
− moving first since Center j has no move available. But Left loses Cj + (1 Cj ) − moving first since Left has no move available after each player has moved once (regardless of which move Center j makes).
Proof. First, we prove ≤ L . If k = 0, then this follows immediately from the Inequality Test since m · 1 Ci has no Left options and 0 · 1 Ci has no non-Left options. If k > 0, then we can add k ·1 Ci to both sides of (m−k)·1 Ci ≤ L 0 by Proposition 4.10.
To show that the inequality is strict, note that Left wins
Proof. k = 0 and k = 1 are trivial, so we assume
By induction and Proposition 4.35 allowing the replacement of options with equals, we may assume
By Proposition 4.40, we see that (k − 1) · 1 L is the best of these options for Left. Thus, we can repeatedly Delete Dominated Options in 
Similarly to the other direction, we need only handle each Left option of k L . It remains to check that (
This follows immediately from Lemma 4.43 with players switched.
Since
Sums of Integers
Proposition 4.45. Evaluating the outcome of a sum of integers (such as 3 C2 ) reduces to the case of evaluating the outcome of a game of the form
Proof. Note that by Theorem 4.44, a sum of multiple integers for the same player can be reduced to a sum of ones; for example, k L + j L = (k + j) · 1 L . Corollary 4.18 tells us that we can make such replacements throughout a sum of integers for various players. By the definition of Partizan Equality (Definition 4.16), the outcome doesn't change when a game is replaced by an equal one. Proposition 4.46. Let k 0 , . . . , k N −1 be nonnegative integers with minimum k min , and i be an integer with 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. If j is the least nonnegative integer with
There is only one line of play. After N * k min moves, all coefficients that were equal to k min have been reduced to 0, so that the next player to move (starting with Center i ) with a corresponding 0 coefficient will lose, and all other players will win. have no choice in their moves, so there is no other way they could play to allow Center i to win.
Games Less than One
In the two-player context, there are results such as {−1 | } = 0, since a move that benefits Right can't help Left. But with three or more players, things are more subtle.
Proof. There are four claims that must be verified. 
then define G to be the game with only one option in which Center 1 can move to
Either way, Left has a winning strategy in {k Ci 
Conclusions
Throughout this paper, we have seen a variety of generalizations of two-player theorems, and regularity in results that apply for N > 2. It appears that the normal play convention considered in this paper may be the easiest to investigate for N players, without discarding parts of the game tree (as in [1] ) or making any assumptions on how players play (as in [3] and other papers mentioned in I.4 of [8] ). That said, when considering combinatorial games with more than two players, there is a world of gaps and fundamental questions that remain unsettled.
For just the case of impartial three-player games, there are other similar play conventions worth considering, each depending on the winner(s) and loser(s) of 0, analogous to misère play. In [6] , Propp analyzed the convention in which Previous is the unique winner of 0. But that still leaves four other non-trivial play conventions that do not seem to have been investigated in the literature. For example, consider the similar convention in which Other is the unique winner of 0. The 2 conventions other than normal play with a unique loser for 0 may be particularly difficult to analyze. Question 1. For reach of the remaining four non-trivial play conventions, investigate the sum table analogous to Table 1 .
Even when restricting ourselves to normal play, much is still unknown. As noted at the end of Subsection 2.2 (just before 2.3), we can build many equal impartial games by replacing one absorbing subposition with another. Are there other equal games? For instance, perhaps 3 · * = 6 · * in the three-player case.
We might hope to find a recursive test for equality similar to the two-player misère Theorem V.3.6 from [8] . However, no simple translation of that result can handle the three-player case under normal play. A key part of that argument is Lemma V.3.3, which uses T ∼ = G Even without more ability to test for equality, it would be nice to complete Proposition 2.16 about the outcomes of 3 · G. While there were no surprises under normal play for doubling, Claim 9 from Section 4 of [6] suggests that there could be another obstruction to the outcome of 3 · G aside from the obstructions that apply to all sums and Proposition 2.15 about move mirroring.
Question 3. Under normal play, is there a game G with three-player outcome N such that P ∈ o(3 · G)?
Restricting ourselves to the particular game of N -player Nim for N > 2, it is not certain how similar things must be to the three-player case. In the proof of Corollary 3.30, we show that certain very large Nim positions are always absorbing. The author suspects this can be improved considerably. The above is far from an exhaustive list of avenues for future research. Loopy games, nondisjunctive compounds, other case studies such as Rhombination from [3] , etc. are all wide open.
Specifically,
• * GHJ denotes the game { * G, * H, * J}. For example, note that * 21 denotes { * 2, * }, rather than a nim-heap of size twenty-one.
• * G # denotes the game { * G}.
• * G H denotes * G + * H.
Some examples of this notation from [8] are as follows.
• * 2 # 320 ∼ = {{ * 2} , * 3, * 2, 0}
• * 2 ##2 ∼ = {{ * 2}} + * 2
• * 2 2## ∼ = {{ * 2 + * 2}}
The following tables are all for impartial games with three players. 
